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Abstract
Strategic behaviors often render the equilibrium outcome inefficient. Recent literature
on information design, a.k.a. signaling, looks to improve equilibria by selectively revealing
information to players in order to influence their actions. Most previous studies have focused
on the prescriptive question of designing optimal signaling schemes. This work departs
from previous research by considering a descriptive question, and looks to quantitatively
characterize the power of signaling (PoS), i.e., how much a signaling designer can improve
her objective at the equilibrium outcome.
We consider four signaling schemes with increasing power: full information, optimal
public signaling, optimal private signaling, and optimal ex-ante private signaling. Our
main result is a clean and tight characterization of the additional power each signaling
scheme has over its predecessors above in the general classes of cost-minimization and payoff-
maximization games where: (1) all players minimize non-negative cost functions or maximize
non-negative payoff functions; (2) the signaling designer (naturally) optimizes the sum of
players’ utilities. We prove that the additional power of signaling — defined as the worst-
case ratio between the equilibrium objectives of any two signaling schemes in the above
list — is bounded precisely by the well-studied notion of the price of anarchy (PoA) of the
corresponding games. Moreover, we show that all these bounds are tight.
1 Introduction
A basic lesson from game theory is that strategic behaviors often render the equilibrium outcome
inefficient. That is, the objective function value of an equilibrium outcome may be far from
that of an optimal outcome in the absence of strategic behaviors. To reduce such inefficiency,
one can “tune” the game equilibrium towards a more desirable outcome, and there are two
primary ways to achieve this goal: through providing incentives or providing information. The
∗This work is done while Nachbar is visiting the University of Virginia as a summer research intern.
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former approach has been widely studied in the celebrated field of mechanism design [27, 29,
7, 9]. This paper, however, focuses on the second approach, namely, improving equilibrium by
providing carefully designed information to influence players’ decisions. This falls into the recent
flourishing literature on information design, a.k.a., signaling or persuasion [11, 19]. Researches
in this literature so far have mainly focused on computing optimal signaling schemes for either
fundamental setups [13, 14, 33, 6] or models motivated by varied applications including auctions
[15, 3, 24], public safety and security [34, 30], conservation [35], privacy protection [36], voting
[5], congestion games [2, 10, 4], recommender systems [25], robot design [21], etc.
Departing from the theme of all these previous works, this paper considers a different style of
question. We look to characterize the power of signaling (PoS) — how much a signaling designer
can improve her objective function of the equilibrium and can we quantitatively characterize this
power? To our knowledge, this descriptive question has not been formally examined before
in the literature of signaling, except for a few studies which implicitly show certain PoS-type
results in the special case of non-atomic routing games [11, 10, 26]. Nevertheless, the study of
the PoS is extremely well-motivated. It not only deepens our understanding about signaling as
an important “knob” to influence equilibrium, but also justifies the value of previous prescriptive
studies of optimal signaling design — after all, the designed optimal signaling schemes are useful
in practice only when the power of signaling is not negligible. Thus PoS is an important measure
when determining the adoption of a signaling scheme in practice, especially when its tradeoff
with other potential drawbacks such as communication costs [17] and fairness concerns [18] need
to be balanced.
We focus on the general classes of cost-minimization games and payoff-maximization games,
where each player minimizes a non-negative cost function or maximizes a non-negative payoff
function. These classes of games are often studied in the literature of the price of anarchy
(PoA) [31], and include many widely studied examples such as routing games, congestion games,
most formats of auctions, valid utility games [32], etc. Like all standard models of signaling,
players’ utilities depend on a common random state of nature θ, which is drawn from a publicly
known prior distribution. A signaling designer, referred to as the sender, has an informational
advantage and can access the realized state θ. The sender is equipped with the natural objective
of optimizing the total welfare, i.e., sum of players’ utilities.
Power of Signaling (PoS). Our goal is to formally quantify the relative power of different types
of signaling schemes as they become less constrained. In particular, we consider four types of
signaling schemes with increasing power: full information (FI), optimal public signaling (Pub),
optimal private signaling (Pri), and optimal ex-ante private signaling (exP). FI is a natural
benchmark without any strategic use of information whereas Pub, Pri, exP are arguably the
three most widely studied schemes in previous literature.1 The power of signaling of scheme B
1Public and private signaling has been extensively studied in previous works. Several recent works study
ex-ante private signaling with motivations from recommender systems [6, 4, 33].
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over A for any A preceding B in list {FI, Pub, Pri, exP}— termed PoS(B:A) — is defined as the
ratio of the sender’s utilities from scheme A and B. This ratio is at least 1 for cost-minimization
games and at most 1 for payoff-maximization games (the same as the range of the price of
anarchy). Moreover, the further it is from 1, the more powerful scheme B is than scheme A.
Characterizations of PoS. Our main result is a clean and tight characterization about the
power of signaling. Concretely, for any cost-minimization game with a random state, we prove
that all the aforementioned PoS ratios are upper bounded by the maximum PoA of its corre-
sponding realized games. Moreover, all these upper bounds are tight in the following sense: for
any ratio r ≥ 1 and any scheme A preceding B in the list {FI, Pub, Pri, exP}, there exists a
Bayesian cost-minimization game where all of its realized games have PoA = r and moreover
PoS(B:A) = r as well. We show that exactly the same results hold for payoff-maximization
games — the PoSs are similarly bounded by PoA and all the bounds are tight.2
Our results reveal the intrinsic connections between the power of signaling and price of
anarchy. Prior to this work, it was not clear that these two concepts are inherently related — PoA
characterizes the worst-case equilibrium welfare whereas PoS characterizes how much information
can be strategically used to improve welfare. To our knowledge, recent work [26] is the only one
to observe this connection but only for the power of public signaling over full information in non-
atomic routing with afffine latency functions. Our results are more systematic and general. An
interesting computational implication of our characterization is that the full information scheme
always serves as an r approximation simultaneously for optimal public signaling, optimal private
signaling and optimal ex-ante private signaling for cost-minimization or reward-maximization
games, where r is the worst PoA among realized games.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cost-Minimization/Payoff-Maximization Games
A cost-minimization game G is a standard strategic game where each player i minimizes a non-
negative cost function ci ≥ 0. Let n denotes the number of players in the game. Each player
i ∈ [n] = {1, · · · , n} has action space Si. Let S = S1 × S2 · · ·Sn denote the space of action
profiles and s ∈ S is a generic action profile. A (randomized) mixed strategy for player i is
a distribution xi over Si where xi(si) is the probability of taking action si. By convention, x
denotes the profile of mixed strategies for all players, and x−i denotes all the mixed strategies
excluding i’s. With slight abuse of notation, let ci(x) = Esi∼xi,∀i ci(s) denote the expected
utility of player i under mixed strategy x. There is also a global objective which is simply to
minimize the sum of the total costs C(x) =
∑
i ci(x).
We adopt the standard mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) as the solution concept. A
2Instead of FI, another natural benchmark scheme is to reveal no information. The PoSs compared to this
benchmark turn out to be unbounded, which we show in Appendix A.
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strategy profile x∗ is a NE if for each player i, ci(x
∗) ≤ ci(xi,x
∗
−i) for any xi ∈ ∆(Si). Let X
∗
denote the set of all NEs. The well-studied concept of the price of anarchy (for mixed equilibria)
for a cost-minimization game is defined as follows [22, 23, 31, 16]
POA =
maxx∗∈X∗ C(x
∗)
mins∈S C(s)
∈ [1,∞) (1)
In other words, the POA is the ratio between the worst Nash equilibrium and the optimal social
outcome.
Remark 1. The PoA can also be defined with respect to pure Nash equilibrium in which case X∗
consists of all pure equilibria. Since not every game admits a pure Nash equilibrium, in striving
for generality, we choose to analyze the version w.r.t. to mixed equilibria since they always exist
in finite games as well as in many infinite games. However, all our results — both upper and
lower bound proofs — hold for pure equilibria as well, so long as they exist.
Payoff-maximization games are defined similarly; here each player i maximizes expected
payoff ui(x) ≥ 0. The global objective is to maximize U(x) =
∑
i ui(x). The price of anarchy
here is defined similarly as POA =
min
x
∗∈X∗ U(x
∗)
maxs∈S U(s)
, which now lies in [0, 1].
This paper concerns games with uncertainty. Specifically, players’ payoffs depend also on
a random state of nature θ drawn from support Θ with distribution λ. We use cθi (s)/u
θ
i (s) to
denote the cost/payoff function at state θ. Such a Bayesian game is denoted by {Gθ}θ∼λ. As is
standard in information design, the prior distribution λ is publicly known to every player. We
assume Θ to be finite for ease of notation, and use λ(θ) to denote the probability of state θ.
However, all our results hold for infinite state space.
2.2 Signaling Schemes and Equilibrium Concepts
This paper adopts the perspective of an informationally advantaged sender who has privileged
access to the realized state θ and would like to strategically signal this information to players in
order to influence their actions. The sender is equipped with the natural objective of optimizing
the sum of the players’ utilities, i.e., the global objective C(x) or U(x), at equilibrium. We
consider three natural types of signaling schemes with increasing generality.
Public Signaling. At a high level, a public signalling scheme constructs a random variable
σ from support Σ — called the signal — that is correlated with the state of nature θ. The
scheme then sends the sampled signal σ publicly to all players, which carries information about
the state θ due to their correlation. Such a public scheme ϕ can be fully described by variables
{ϕ(σ; θ)}σ∈Σ,θ∈Θ where ϕ(σ; θ) is the probability of sending signal σ conditioned on state of
nature θ. Adopting the standard information design assumption [20, 19], the sender commits
to the signaling scheme before state θ is realized. Therefore, ϕ is publicly known to all players.
The probability of sending signal σ equals Pr(σ) =
∑
θ λ(θ)ϕ(σ; θ). Upon receiving signal σ, all
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players perform a standard Bayesian update and infer the following posterior probability about
the state θ: Pr(θ|σ) = λ(θ)ϕ(σ; θ)/P (σ).
Since all players receive the same information, the game will be played according to the
expected cost ci(s;σ) =
∑
θPr(θ|σ)c
θ
i (s) or ui(s;σ) =
∑
θ Pr(θ|σ)u
θ
i (s) for all i and signal σ.
We assume that players will reach a NE of this average game. Let C(σ) denote the sender’s
expected cost at equilibrium under signal σ and C(ϕ) =
∑
σ Pr(σ)C(σ) denote the expected
sender cost under signaling scheme ϕ. Like the PoA literature, when there are multiple Nash
equilibria, we always adopt the worst one in our analysis. Notations for payoff maximization
are defined similarly.
Private Signaling. Private signaling relaxes public signaling by allowing the sender to send
different, and possibly correlated, signals to different players. Specifically, let Σi denote the set
of possible signals to player i and Σ = Σ1× ...×Σn denote the set of all possible signal profiles.
With slight abuse of notation, a private signaling scheme can be similarly captured by variables
{ϕ(σ; θ)}θ∈Θ,σ∈Σ. When signal profile σ is restricted to have the same signal to all players, this
degenerates to public signaling. Private signaling leads to a truly Bayesian game where each
player holds different information about the state of nature. The standard solution concept
in this case is the Bayes correlated equilibrium (BCE) introduced by Bergemann and Morris
[1], which consists of all outcomes that can possibly arise at Bayes Nash equilibrium under
all possible signaling schemes. Standard revelation-principle type argument shows that signals
of private signaling schemes in a BCE can be interpreted as obedient action recommendations
[20, 1, 13]. That is, Σi can W.L.O.G. be Si and Σ = S. An action recommendation si to player
i is obedient if following this recommended action is indeed a best response for i, or formally,
for any si, s
′
i ∈ Si we have
∑
θ∈Θ,s−i∈S−i
ϕ(si, s−i; θ)λ(θ)c
θ
i (si, s−i) ≥
∑
θ∈Θ,s−i∈S−i
ϕ(si, s−i; θ)λ(θ)c
θ
i (s
′
i, s−i) (2)
Ex-Ante Private Signaling. Motivated by recommender system applications, recent works
[33, 6, 4] relax the obedience constraints (2) of BCE to a coarse correlated equilibrium type of
obedience constraints, described as follows:
∑
θ∈Θ,s∈S
ϕ(si, s−i; θ)λ(θ)c
θ
i (si, s−i) ≥
∑
θ∈Θ,s∈S
ϕ(si, s−i; θ)λ(θ)c
θ
i (s
′
i, s−i),∀s
′
i ∈ Si. (3)
That is, for any player i, following the recommendation is better than opting out of the signaling
scheme and acting just according to his prior belief. A signaling scheme satisfying Constraint
(3) is dubbed an ex-ante private scheme [6, 4].
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3 The Power of Signaling (PoS)
We now formalize the Power of Signaling (PoS) in cost-minimization and payoff-maximization
games. Intuitively, the PoS characterizes how much additional power a class of signaling schemes
has over another. Formally, let Φa and Φb be two classes of signaling schemes (e.g., public and
private schemes). We say Φb is less restricted than Φa, conveniently denoted as Φa ⊆ Φb, if
ϕ ∈ Φb whenever ϕ ∈ Φa.
Definition 1 (PoS of Φb over Φa). For any two classes of signaling schemes Φa,Φb where Φb
is less restricted than Φa (i.e., Φa ⊆ Φb), the power of signaling of Φb over Φa, or PoS(Φb : Φa)
for short, is defined as
PoS(Φb : Φa) =
minϕ∈Φa C(ϕ)
minϕ∈Φb C(ϕ)
(
or
maxϕ∈Φa U(ϕ)
maxϕ∈Φb U(ϕ)
)
,
for cost-minimization (or payoff-maximization) games.
In other words, PoS is the ratio between the objectives of the optimal scheme from signaling
class Φa and that from a less restricted class Φb. Similar to the PoA ratio, PoS(Φb : Φa) ≥ 1
for cost-minimization games, and the larger this ratio is, the more powerful Φb is over Φa. In
contrast, PoS(Φb : Φa) ≤ 1 for payoff-maximization games, and the smaller this ratio is, the
more powerful Φb is over Φa. If both the numerator and denominator are 0, we say the PoS is
1; if only the denominator is 0, the PoS is +∞.
Though PoS is well-defined for any two classes of signaling schemes, in this paper we primarily
consider the following well-studied classes of signaling schemes:
• Φ1 or FI: full information ;
• Φ2 or Pub: public signaling schemes;
• Φ3 or Pri: private signaling schemes;
• Φ4 or exP: ex-ante private signaling schemes.
The full information class FI only contains a single signaling scheme, i.e., fully revealing
the state θ. This serves as a benchmark scheme where information is not strategically signaled.
Another natural benchmark scheme is to reveal no information. We show in Appendix A that
the PoS compared to this benchmark turns out to be unbounded.
4 PoS in Cost-Minimization Games
The main result of this section is the following tight characterization about the PoS ratios in
cost-minimization games.
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Theorem 1. For any Bayesian cost-minimization game {Gθ}θ∼λ, let PoAmax = maxθ PoA(G
θ)
denote the worst PoA ratio among game Gθs. We have
PoS(Φj : Φi) ≤ PoAmax, ∀ 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 4. (4)
Moreover, these upper bounds are all tight in the following sense: for any r ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ i <
j ≤ 4, there exits a Bayesian cost-minimization game {Gθ}θ∼λ with PoA(G
θ) = r for any θ and
PoS(Φj : Φi) = r as well.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1. The following simple
observation follows from Definition 1 of the PoS, and will be useful for proving the tightness of
the bounds in Inequality (4).
Fact 1. For any 1 ≤ i < j < j′ ≤ 4, we have
PoS(Φj : Φi) ≤ PoS(Φj
′
: Φi).
As a consequence of Fact 1, if we prove the tightness of PoS(Φ2 : Φ1), i.e., PoS(Pub:FI) by
constructing an example with PoS(Pub:FI) = PoAmax, the example must satisfy PoS(Pri:FI) =
PoS(exP:FI) = PoAmax as well, implying their tightness. Therefore, to prove the tightness
of Inequality (4), we only need to prove the tightness of PoS(Pub:FI), PoS(Pri:Pub) and
PoS(exP:Pri).
4.1 A Simultaneous Proof of all the PoS Upper Bounds
We first prove all the upper bounds in Inequality (4) through a unified result, summarized in
the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For any Bayesian cost-minimization game {Gθ}θ∼λ, we have PoS(Φ
b : Φa) ≤
maxθ PoA(G
θ) for any two classes of signaling schemes Φa,Φb satisfying Φa ⊆ Φb and that the
full information scheme is contained in Φa.
Proof. Let PoAmax = maxθ PoA(G
θ) be the worst (i.e., the maximum) price of anarchy ratio
among game Gθs. Denote by C∗(Gθ) = mins∈S C(S) the minimum total social cost among
all outcomes (not necessarily an equilibrium) for game Gθ; let s
θ∗ be an strategy profile that
achieves C∗(Gθ). ϕ
0 denotes the full information revelation scheme.
Observe that for any signaling scheme ϕ we must have C(ϕ) ≥
∑
θ λ(θ)C
∗(Gθ) because
regardless of how players act in the scheme ϕ, its expected total cost can never be less than the
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minimum possible total cost
∑
θ λ(θ)C
∗(Gθ). Now since Φa contains ϕ0, we thus have
min
ϕ′∈Φa
C(ϕ′) ≤ C(ϕ0)
=
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ)C(Gθ)
≤
∑
θ∈Θ
λ(θ) · rC∗(Gθ)
≤ rC(ϕ), for any scheme ϕ
where C(Gθ) is the worst (i.e., maximum) equilibrium cost of game G
θ and the second inequality
is by the definition of the price of anarchy. As a result, PoS(Φb : Φa) =
minϕ′∈Φa C(ϕ
′)
min
ϕ∈Φb
C(ϕ) ≤ r, as
desired.
4.2 Tightness of the Upper-Bound for PoS(Pub:FI)
Non-Atomic Routing. It turns out that all the PoS bounds in Theorem 1 are tight in a
special and well-studied class of cost-minimization games, i.e., non-atomic routing. The game
takes place on a directed graph G = (V,E) with V as the vertex set and E as the edge set. There
is a continuum of players, each controlling a negligible amount of flow characterized by a pair
of nodes (s, t) where s ∈ V is the starting node of the flow and t ∈ V is its destination. In non-
atomic routing with incomplete information, each edge e ∈ E can be described by a congestion
function cθe(x) which depends on the total amount of flow x on edge e as well as a random state
of nature θ ∈ Θ. Each player (s, t) optimizes her own utility by taking a minimum-cost directed
path from s to t. The sender minimizes overall congestion cost. There is an essentially unique
pure Nash equilibrium for non-atomic routing under a public scheme. Therefore, equilibrium
selection is not an issue in non-atomic routing.
We now show the tightness of PoS(Pub:FI) for any ratio r ≥ 1 via a non-atomic routing game
example, which implies the tightness of PoS(Pri:FI) and PoS(exP:FI) by Fact 1. Consider a
variant of Pigou’s example [28], as depicted in Figure 1, where cost functions are described on
each edge. The traffic demand from s1 to t is set as d(α) =
(
1
α+1
) 1
α
whereas the demand from
s2 to t is 1− d(α). Each state of nature occurs with probability 0.5.
s2
t
s1
xα
1
2 0
θ1
s2
t
s1
xα
1
0 2
θ2
Figure 1: A Tight Example for PoS(Pub:FI)
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First, we compute the price of anarchy (PoA) of each game, as a function of α. Clearly, at
equilibrium no flow will pass through the edge with cost 2 since deviating to the edge with cost
0 is strictly better. It is easy to see that at equilibrium all flow will go through the edge with
cost xα, leading to total congestion 1 at equilibrium. The optimal flow, however, is that all flow
at s1 goes through edge (s1, t) and all flow at s2 goes through (s2, t), leading to minimum total
congestion
(
1
α+1
) (α+1)
α
+1 −
(
1
α+1
) 1
α
. Therefore, the PoA as a function of α in this instance is
PoA =
1(
1
α+1
) (α+1)
α
+ 1 −
(
1
α+1
) 1
α
, (5)
which is a continuous function of α > 0. Standard analysis shows that this function tends to ∞
as α → ∞ and tends to 1 as α → 0+. For the special case of α = 0, it can be directly verified
that the PoA ratio is 1. Therefore, this PoA ratio can take any value r ≥ 1 with a proper choice
of α.
We now consider the cost of the full information scheme FI. In this case, all flow will always go
through the edge with cost 1 at equilibrium, leading to total cost 1. The optimal public scheme
in this example happens to be revealing no information. Without being able to distinguish the
zero-cost edge from the edge of cost 2, all flow at s2 will take the (s2, t) path. This achieves the
minimum total cost, rendering the PoS(Pub:FI) ratio equal the PoA for any n.
4.3 Tightness of the Upper-Bound for PoS(Pri:Pub)
We now show the tightness of PoS(Pri:Pub) for any ratio r ≥ 1, which implies the tightness
of PoS(exP:Pub) by Fact 1. We construct a Bayesian non-atomic routing game as depicted in
Figure 2, which can be viewed as another variant of Pigou’s example.3 There is a 1 unit of flow
demand from s to t. Each state has equal probability 0.5.
s t
2
1
xα
θ1
s t
xα
1
2
θ2
Figure 2: A Tight Example for PoS(Pri:Pub)
Similarly to the calculation for the Example in Figure 1, the PoA for each game here also
equals that as described in Equation (5). We now argue that the expected cost of any public
signaling scheme will equal 1 in this example — i.e., all public schemes are equally bad and
will not be able to reduce any congestion. Any public signal gives the same information about
3This example generalizes an earlier example observed by Cheng, Dughmi and Xu [11]. It also avoided their
use of the (unrealistic) ∞ flow cost, and relies on a less trivial analysis due to the finite edge cost.
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the game state to all players. Let λ ∈ [0, 1] denote the posterior probability of θ1 given any
public signal. W.l.o.g., consider the case λ ≥ 0.5 since the other case is symmetric. The top
edge will have expected cost 2λ+ xα(1− λ) > 1 for any x > 0, therefore this edge will never be
taken since the bottom edge is a strictly better choice. Consequently, players will be choosing
between the middle edge, with expected cost function f(x) =: xαλ+ 2(1 − λ), and the bottom
edge with fixed cost 1. Note that f(0) = 2(1 − λ) ≤ 1 and f(1) = 1− λ ≥ 1. Therefore, at the
unique equilibrium, the amount of flow through the middle edge will be exactly the x∗ such that
f(x∗) = 1 whereas the remaining flow will be through the bottom edge. The expected total cost
at this equilibrium is 1.
Finally, we show that the optimal private signaling will be able to induce the optimal flow,
concluding our tightness proof. Consider the following private signaling scheme: revealing full
information to a randomly selected x∗ = (1/(α + 1))1/α fraction of the players, and revealing
no information to the remaining players. The x∗ fraction of players given the full information
has a dominant action of taking the edge with cost xα at the told state. For the remaining
players with no information, their cost of taking either the top or the middle edge will be at
least 2× (1/2) + (x∗)α× (1/2) > 1. Therefore, their optimal response will be taking the bottom
edge. This leads to exactly the optimal flow for each state, as desired.
4.4 Tightness of the Upper-Bound for PoS(exP:Pri)
Finally, we prove the tightness of PoS(exP:Pri). Consider the non-atomic routing game depicted
in Figure 3.4 There is one unit of flow from s to t and the two states θ1, θ2 occurs with equal
probability 0.5.
s t
α+ 1
α+ 1
1
xα
θ1
s t
α+ 1
α+ 1
1
xα
θ2
Figure 3: A Tight Example for PoS(exP:Pri)
Similar to the analysis for previous examples, the PoA for each game equals also the function
described in Equation (5), which takes value in [1,∞) as we vary the parameter α.
Next we argue that the optimal private signaling scheme is full-revelation, with cost 1. Recall
from the preliminary section, any private scheme can be viewed as obedient action recommen-
dations. Numbering the edges from the top to the bottom as edge 1, 2, 3, 4, we claim that any
obedient action recommendation should never recommend edge 2 and 3. This is because if a non-
zero amount of players are recommended, e.g., to edge 2, switching to edge 1 or 4 will be strictly
4This example generalizes an earlier example observed by Cheng [8] after removing (unrealistic) ∞ cost edges.
Note that the analysis of the example becomes less obvious without the use of ∞ costs.
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better. In particular, if the players are certain that they are at state θ1, they will prefer to switch
to edge 4. Otherwise, there is non-zero probability that they are at state θ2. In this case, switch-
ing to edge 1 is strictly better. Consequently, the optimal private scheme can be captured by two
variables: (1) x: the amount of flow recommended to edge 4 at state θ1 (thus edge 1 consumes
the remaining 1−x amount); (2) y: the amount of flow recommended to edge 1 at θ2. It can be
shown that the parameterized total expected cost [xα+1+(α+1)(1−x)+yα+1+(α+1)(1−y)]/2
is minimized at x = 1, y = 1, i..e, the full information scheme.
Finally, we show that the optimal ex-ante private scheme achieves the minimum possible
total social cost, concluding the tightness proof of PoS(exP:Pri). In particular, consider the
ex-ante private scheme that induces the optimal flow by recommending a randomly chosen
(1/(α + 1))1/α amount of the flow to the edge with cost xα at any state and the remaining flow
to the edge with cost 1. This is indeed obedient in the ex-ante sense because opting out from
this scheme and taking any path will lead to cost at least (α + 1 + 1α+1 )/2, which is at least 1
and thus is larger than its expected utility in the scheme (less than 1).
5 PoS in Payoff-Maximization Games
In this section, we show that a similar tight characterization as in Theorem 1 holds for payoff-
maximization games as well.
Theorem 3. For any Bayesian payoff-maximization game {Gθ}θ∼λ, let PoAmin = minθ PoA(G
θ)
denote the worst-case PoA ratio among game Gθs. We have
PoS(Φj : Φi) ≥ PoAmin, ∀1 ≤ i < j ≤ 4. (6)
Moreover, these lower bounds are all tight in the following sense: for any r ∈ (0, 1] and any
1 ≤ i < j ≤ 4, there exits a Bayesian payoff-maximization game {Gθ}θ∼λ with PoA(G
θ) = r for
any θ and PoS(Φj : Φi) = r as well.
Remark 2. In payoff-maximization games, the smaller PoS is, the more powerful signaling is.
Therefore, Inequality (6) is a lower bound for the PoS ratio but an upper bound for the power of
signaling. Similar discrepancies also arise in the definition of the PoA for payoff-maximization
game [31].
The remaining of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3. A simultaneous proof
of all the PoS lower bounds in Inequality (6) follow an analogous argument as that for Theorem
2, and thus is omitted here. We only prove their tightness. One might wonder whether the
tightness proof here can be adapted from that for cost-minimization games by simply reversing
minimizing cost functions to be maximizing their negations (plus a large constant to make it
positive). The answer turns out to be no. We illustrate the detailed reasons in the Appendix
B, but at a high level there are at least two reasons. First, the optimal flow for congestion
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minimization may not be optimal any more in the negation of the game. Second, some PoA
ratios cannot be achieved in the negation of routing games.
Our tightness proof here requires carefully constructed payoff-maximization games and anal-
ysis. Thanks to Fact 1, we will only need to prove the tightness of PoS(Pub:FI), PoS(Pri:Pub)
and PoS(exP:Pri).
5.1 Tightness of the Lower-Bound for PoS(Pub:FI)
Consider the following game played by two players P1, P2 where α, ǫ are parameters satisfying
α−1 > 2ǫ > 0. Each player has two actions, conveniently denoted as A,B. There are two states
θ1, θ2 with equal probability 0.5. The only difference of the two states is the payoffs for action
profile (B,A), which is (1, α) at state θ1 and (α, 1) at state θ2.
P2
A B
P1
A (1 + ǫ, 1) (1− ǫ, 1− ǫ)
B (1, α) (1, 1 + ǫ)
θ1
P2
A B
P1
A (1 + ǫ, 1) (1− ǫ, 1− ǫ)
B (α, 1) (1, 1 + ǫ)
θ2
We first consider full information (FI). At state θ1, action A is a strictly dominant action
for Player 2. This implies that both players choosing action A is the only Nash equilibrium,
resulting in sender utility 2 + ǫ. However, the optimal outcome at state θ1 is that Player 1
chooses B and Player 2 chooses A, leading to total payoff α + 1 (> 2 + 2ǫ since α − 1 > 2ǫ).
State θ2 is symmetric. The expected utility of full information is 2+ ǫ, and the PoA of each game
is 2+ǫα+1 .
We now show that the optimal public signaling scheme can maximize total payoff. Consider
the scheme which reveals no information at all. The only change is that the expected payoffs
of action profile (B,A) becomes α+12 for both players. We see then, that A remains a strictly
dominant strategy for Player 2 and B becomes a strictly dominant action for Player 1. The only
equilibrium is the action profile (B,A), resulting in expected sender utility α + 1. Therefore,
PoS(Pub:FI) = 2+ǫα+1 , equaling the price of anarchy. If α → 1, the PoS ratio tends to 1, and
α → ∞ with a fixed ǫ makes the PoS ratio continuously tend to 0. Setting α = 1 + ǫ gives a
trivial case where the PoS and PoA are both 1. Thus, the ratio achieves all possible values within
(0, 1].
5.2 Tightness of the Lower-Bound for PoS(Pri:Pub)
The Robber’s Game. As a means of illustrating our constructed game, consider two robbers
robbing a bank. They have triggered the alarm, and are pressed for time. As they enter the
vault, they have to make a decision. In the vault are two safes, and a huge pile of cash. There
are three options: attempt to crack Safe 1 (action S1), Safe 2 (action S2), or simply take as
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much cash as they can carry (action C), worth α. In order to protect the bank’s valuable items,
one of the safes is a decoy safe, and is empty. Inside the other safe are two objects: a gold bar
worth α+ ǫ, where 1 ≥ α > ǫ > 0, and an extremely delicate but valuable crystal worth 1. The
two robbers (players) have very different skill sets. Player 1 (P1) is a lock picking expert, and
Player 2 (P2) is a demolitions expert. The players’ payoffs equal whatever they individually
steal from the vault. Only P2 is capable of carrying the crystal without breaking it. If P1 cracks
the safe using his lockpicking, P2 can take the crystal on the way out, leaving P1 with the gold
bar. However, if P2 cracks the safe, the crystal will be destroyed due to his explosions, leaving
him only the gold bar. In addition, if both players try to crack the same safe, they get in each
others’ way and are forced to leave with nothing.
P2
S1 C S2
S1 (0, 0) (0, α) (0, α + ǫ)
P1 C (α, 0) (α,α) (α,α + ǫ)
S2 (α + ǫ, 1) (α + ǫ, 1) (0, 0)
θ1
P2
S1 C S2
S1 (0, 0) (α+ ǫ, 1) (α+ ǫ, 1)
P1 C (α,α + ǫ) (α,α) (α, 0)
S2 (0, α + ǫ) (0, α) (0, 0)
θ2
Figure 5: Payoffs of the robber’s game achieving tight PoS(Pri:Pub); each state occurs with
probability 0.5.
Concretely, the payoff matrix for the aforementioned game is in the above tables. At θ1, safe
1 is empty, and at θ2, safe 2 is empty. Note that θ2 simply exchanges the payoffs of strategies S1
and S2 symmetrically for both players. A-priori, both robbers do not know the state and share
the common uniform random prior. The sender is a heist leader and knows which safe is which.
The sender gets to pocket a cut of the total haul, so naturally she is interested in maximizing
the total utility. In public signaling, both robbers use the same radio to communicate with the
sender, but in private signaling each player has his own communication radio.
We first calculate the PoA for the game at each state. W.l.o.g., we consider equilibria for
state θ1 as θ2 is symmetric. Since action C dominates action S1 (i.e., cracking the empty safe)
for both players, without loss of generality we will assume both players do not play action S1
in our following analysis. It is easy to see that (S2, C) and (C,S2)) are the only two pure
Nash equilibria after excluding action S1. We now consider mixed equilibrium in this game.
Note that since both players have only two actions, both players must randomize in any mixed
equilibrium. Let λ1, λ2 ∈ (0, 1) denote the probability that player 1 and 2 play C, respectively.
We have λ2(α + ǫ) = α since player 1’s both actions must be equally good, and similarly
λ1α+ (1−λ1) = (α+ ǫ)λ1. This implies λ1 = 1/(1+ ǫ) and λ2 = α/(α+ ǫ). The total expected
payoff of this mixed strategy equilibrium is α+(α+ ǫ)/(1+ ǫ), which is the smallest equilibrium
total payoff. The largest social payoff is however α + ǫ + 1. Therefore, the PoA of this game is
2α+ǫ+αǫ
(1+α+ǫ)(1+ǫ) .
We now show that the optimal public signalling scheme is to reveal full information, assuming
worst-case equilibrium selection. We prove this by arguing that for any public signal with
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posterior probability p ∈ [0, 1] of state θ1, the sender’s utility is at most U0 = α+(α+ ǫ)/(1+ ǫ)
in the worst equilibrium, which is the sender utility of full information revelation. This follows
a case analysis, depending on whether p is between ǫα+ǫ and
α
α+ǫ , greater than or equal to
α
α+ǫ ,
or less than or equal to ǫα+ǫ . By cases:
1. When p(α+ ǫ) < α and (α+ ǫ)(1− p) < α, i.e., ǫα+ǫ < p <
α
α+ǫ (recall that our parameter
choice satisfies α > ǫ). In this case, for P1, the utility α of the safer action C is strictly
larger than the best possible expected utility (α+ ǫ)(1− p) of taking action S1 and larger
than the best possible expected utility (α + ǫ)p of taking action S2 as well. Given that
P1 will always take C, P2 strictly prefers C as well as his utility (α + ǫ)(1 − p) for
S1 and utility (α + ǫ)p for S2 are both smaller. Therefore, both players taking action
C is the unique equilibrium, leading to sender utility 2α which is less than U0 since
U0 > α+ (α+ ǫα)/(1 + ǫ) = 2α.
2. When p(α+ ǫ) ≥ α. In this case, state θ1 is very likely and action S1 is strictly dominated
by action C for P1 and thus will not be taken by P1. We show that there exists a mixed
strategy that has sender utility worse than U0. In particular, consider the following mixed
strategies: (1) P1 chooses action C with probability pC =
p+α(1−p)
ǫp+p and action S2 with
remaining probability 1 − pC ; (2) P2 chooses action C with probability qC =
α
(α+ǫ)p and
action S2 with remaining probability 1 − qC . We claim that this is a mixed strategy
equilibrium. In particular, both action C and S2 have expected utility α to P1 and both
action C and S2 have expected utility pC(α + ǫ)p. Therefore, the sender’s utility at the
worst mixed equilibrium is at most
α+
p+ α(1− p)
ǫp+ p
(α+ ǫ)p = α+
α+ ǫ
ǫ+ 1
[p+ α(1 − p)]
≤ α+
α+ ǫ
ǫ+ 1
= U0.
3. When (1 − p)(α + ǫ) ≥ α, i.e. p ≤ ǫα+ǫ . This case is symmetric to Case 2, and thus has
the same conclusion.
Finally, we argue that the optimal private scheme results in the optimal social outcome.
Consider the private scheme that reveals no information to Player 2 but full information to
Player 1. Given no information, Player 2 has a strictly dominant action C since ǫ < α. With
full information, Player 1 will always open the non-empty safe. This leads to the optimal
outcome and sender utility 1 + α + ǫ. Therefore, the PoS(Pri:Pub) for this game equals the
PoA = 2α+ǫ+αǫ(1+α+ǫ)(1+ǫ) . We see that when α = 1 and ǫ → 0, the PoA tends to 1; when α → 0 and
ǫ→ 0, the PoA tends to 0. When α = 1 and ǫ = 0, we have a trivial case, with PoA and PoS 1.
Thus its ratio takes any value within (0, 1].
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5.3 Tightness of the Lower-Bound for PoS(exP:Pri)
Finally, for any r ∈ (0, 1], we show the tightness of PoS(exP:Pri). Consider the same two
robbers, robbing the same bank. However, the bank has now upgraded its anti-theft counter-
measures. Instead of a decoy safe, there is now an entire decoy vault. Naturally, any robber who
goes into it will leave empty-handed. In the real vault, there is again a large pile of cash, but
now (only) one safe. A robber can choose to take cash for a guaranteed payoff (α+ ǫ for Player
1, α for Player 2). The safe contains the same fragile, valuable crystal as in the previous section,
but this time, no gold bar. If both players attempt to crack the safe, they get in each others’
way and will fail. After cracking the safe, each player has enough time to take cash instead of
the contents of the safe if they choose. We assume 1 ≥ α > ǫ ≥ 0 and α + ǫ < 1. If Player 2
attempts to take the cash, and Player 1 cracks the safe, Player 2 can take the crystal on the way
out, instead of the cash. However, if Player 2 does not go into the correct vault, he will leave
with nothing. The detailed payoff is as in the following table. Here, θ1 corresponds to the first
vault being the decoy one, whereas θ2 corresponds to the second vault being empty. Each state
occurs with equal probability 0.5. The sender as the heist leader knows which vault is empty.
P2
C1 S1 C2 S2
P1
C1 (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, ǫ) (0, ǫ)
S1 (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, α) (0, α)
C2 (α+ ǫ, 0) (α+ ǫ, 0) (α+ ǫ, α) (α+ ǫ, α)
S2 (α, 0) (α, 0) (α, 1) (0, 0)
θ1
P2
C1 S1 C2 S2
P1
C1 (α+ ǫ, α) (α+ ǫ, α) (α+ ǫ, 0) (α+ ǫ, 0)
S1 (α, 1) (0, 0) (α, 0) (α, 0)
C2 (0, α) (0, α) (0, 0) (0, 0)
S2 (0, α) (0, α) (0, 0) (0, 0)
θ2
Figure 6: Payoffs of the robber’s game variant with tight PoS(exP:Pri); each state occurs with
probability 0.5.
We first calculate the PoA of each game. For the game at state θ1, it is easy to see that action
C2 strictly dominates all other actions for Player 1. This leads to (C2, C2) and (C2, S2) be the
two unique NEs and the total payoff of any equilibrium is (α+ ǫ) + α = 2α+ ǫ. The maximum
total payoff however is α + 1, under action profile (S2, C2). Similar analysis holds for state θ2.
The PoA for each game is thus (2α+ ǫ)/(1 + α) (recall α+ ǫ < 1 in our game).
We now argue that an optimal private scheme is to reveal full information. Crucially, Player
1’s strictly dominant action is to take C1 or C2, whichever is more likely to get the α + ǫ cash
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amount in the posterior distribution of his private signal. Given this, Player 2’s optimal action
is to choose C1/S1 or C2/S2, whichever is more likely to get the α payoff (from cash or from
opening the safe) in the posterior distribution of his private signal. Consequently, any partial
information will lead to Player 1 utility at most α + ǫ and Player 2 utility at most α. This
renders full information revelation optimal, leading to total player utility 2α+ ǫ.
Finally, we show that an ex-ante signaling scheme induces the optimal outcome. The scheme
simply recommends (S2, C2) at state θ1 and (S1, C1) at state θ2. This satisfies the ex-ante
obedience constraint (3) because: (1) if Player 1 opts out and acts according to his prior belief,
he gets expected utility at most 12(α+ ǫ), which is strictly less than his utility α in the scheme;
(2) Player 2 gets utility 1 in the scheme and certainly does not want to opt out. Therefore, the
PoS(exP:Pri) ratio in this game equals precisely the PoA of each game 2α+ǫ1+α . This ratio tends
to 1 as α + ǫ → 1 and tends to 0 as α, ǫ → 0+. If α + ǫ = 1, the PoA and PoS(exP:Pri) are
trivially equal to 1. Therefore, the ratio takes any value r ∈ (0, 1].
6 Discussions and Future Work
In this paper, we initiate and formalize the concept of the power of signaling (PoS). In the general
classes of cost-minimization and payoff-maximization games, we show that the PoS is inherently
related to, in fact precisely characterized by, the price of anarchy (PoA).
There are many possibilities for future research. In our analysis, we use the full informa-
tion scheme (FI) as the benchmark, since the no information scheme (NI) will lead to infinite
bound. However, another natural and stronger benchmark is the better of these two schemes FI,
NI. With such a stronger benchmark, the power of signaling will not increase. One interesting
question is whether we will have strictly less power of signaling when compared to this strong
benchmark. We observe that positive answers to this characterization question will have inter-
esting algorithmic implications. For example, even restricting to non-atomic routing games with
linear latency functions, if one can show that PoS(Pub:max{FI,NI}) = r for some r < 4/3, this
would imply that the better between FI and NI — which certainly can be computed efficiently
— will serve as an r-approximation for optimal public signaling. However, it is proved in [2] that
it is NP-hard to approximate optimal public signaling for this setting to be within a ratio better
than 4/3 in this setting. This shows that for non-atomic routing with linear latency functions,
even PoS(Pub:max{FI,NI}) is strictly smaller than the PoA ratio 4/3, it will be NP-hard to
prove this conclusion since any proof implies an efficient approximation algorithm with ratio
strictly better than 4/3.
The above discussion considers stronger benchmark schemes. Another direction is to study
the power of signaling for more restricted classes of signaling schemes, such as schemes with
limited communication power [12] or schemes with costly communication [17]? For these classes
of schemes, the power of signaling will also decrease. It is interesting to understand how much
these restrictions limit the power of signaling. On the other hand, the sender’s objective con-
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sidered in this paper is the total social welfare. In many applications of signaling, the sender’s
objective may be different from the welfare, e.g., revenue as in auctions. In this case, tools be-
yond the price of anarchy may be needed since PoA mainly concerns welfare. It is an intriguing
open direction to characterize the power of signaling in these settings.
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A PoS w.r.t the No Information (NI) Benchmark
In the main body of our paper, we choose full information (FI) as our benchmark scheme. One
might wonder what happens if the no information scheme is used instead. It turns out that no
information (NI) may lead to very bad social welfare, and examples are fairly easy to construct.
Massicot and Langbort gave a Bayesian cost-minimization game with PoA = 4/3 for each game
— more concretely, a non-atomic routing game example with affine latency function — such
that PoS(Pub:NI)→∞ [26].
We now exhibit a simple reward-maximization game with PoA = 1 but PoS(Pub:NI) → 0.
Consider a (trivial) game with n actions A1, A2, A3, ..., An and a single player. There are n
equally likely states of nature, with each state of nature θi gives utility 1 to action Ai and 0
utility to all other actions. The price of anarchy of this game is trivially 1, since there is only one
reward-maximizing player, and full information as the optimal public scheme achieves optimal
welfare 1. However, in the case of no information, the player can only get expected utility 1n .
As n→∞, PoS(Pub:NI)→ 0.
B Non-tightness of PoS in “Reverse” Routing
When proving the tightness for payoff-maximization games, a very natural first attempt is,
perhaps, to convert the previously constructed cost-minimization routing games into payoff-
maximization games by flipping the sign of cost functions and adding a large constant to make
it positive. One example by reversing our game constructed for the tightness of PoS(Pri:Pub)
is depicted in Figure 7. That is, any edge with cost function ce(x) in our original construction
can be changed to instead having payoff N − ce(x) for large positive constant N . Clearly, this
is a valid payoff-maximization game, which we term “reverse” routing game for convenience.
s t
N - 2
N − 1
N − xα
Figure 7: A reverse routing example
We argue this natural adaptation of our previous routing game constructions in this way
does not produce an example with, e.g., tight PoS(Pri:Pub) ratio. This is why we must turn
to new constructions of payoff-maximization games. There are two reasons. First, this adaption
cannot lead to any price of anarchy ratio within (0, 1). In particular, it can be verified that
the PoA of the game in Figure 7 is at least 1/2 since N ≥ 2. The second major reason is that
optimal routes in the standard cost-minimization routing game may not be optimal any more in
its natural adaption to the reward-maximization situation. For example, in cost minimization,
one never wants to route through a cycle but in its reward maximization variant, we would like
to route through a cycle as much as possible to collect rewards (such examples are fairly easy
to construct).
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